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SEARCH ENGINES SCORE ANOTHER PERFECT 10:
THE CONTINUED MISUSE OF COPYRIGHTED IMAGES ON THE
INTERNET
Sara Ayazi 1
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that search
engines' reproduction of images for use as thumbnails is a fair use
under the Copyright Act. This Recent Development critiques the
Ninth Circuit's analysis in determining whether a search engine
infringed on a copyright holder's rights. The author proposes that
this ruling broadened the scope offair use on the Internet. As a
result, Kelly does not fulfill copyright law's goal of providing a
balance between the rights of the copyright holder and the rights
of the general public. However, a recent ruling against the search
engine Google may be one of the first steps toward curtailing
search engines 'power.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the search engine on the Internet, there
has been a clash between copyright holders desperately clinging to
their rights and search engines claiming their indexing function
fulfills copyright law's purpose to encourage creativity for the
enrichment of the public. A search engine indexes websites on the
Internet through the use of software that automatically scans and
stores content available on each website into an easily searchable
and accessible catalog.2 Norman Zada, president of the California-
based adult entertainment company, Perfect 10, filed an injunction
against the search engine Google.com ("Google") for displaying
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2007. Special
thanks to Professor Laura Gasaway, Director of the UNC Law Library and
Professor of Law, James Van Orden, Mike Mullen, Ali Ayazi, and Golriz Ayazi
for their guidance and support.
2 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. at 3-4 (C.D. CA Feb.
17, 2006).
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over 3,000 images that are protected under Perfect 10's copyright.3
Perfect 10 argued that its business heavily relies on its copyrighted
works and that Google's continuous infringement of these rights is
"devastating to, and threatens the existence" of its business.4
Perfect 10's website, Perfectl0.com, allows users to access
photographs, video productions, and other materials by using a
secure password in return for a monthly subscription fee.'
Searches performed using Google's visual search engine generated
thousands of copies of Perfect 10's copyrighted works, which
Google reproduced and displayed on its servers without
permission. Despite approximately thirty formal requests asking
Google to remove the images from its search results, the search
engine continued to display these images. Perfect 10 argued that
Google "is a commercial advertising operation determined to
increase revenue regardless of what rights it tramples on in the
process."6
Perfect 10 set forth several arguments advancing the claim that
Google's unauthorized use of its copyrighted images harmed
Perfect 10's profit margin. Perfect 10 asserted that its reduced-
sized images have a commercial value.7 For example, Perfect 10
sells thousands of reduced-sized images per month for display on
cell phones, a growing market estimated to be worth $500 million.8
Moreover, according to Perfect 10, Google was not only displaying
thousands of Perfect 10's copyrighted images without
3 Porn Site Tries to Censor Google Image Search, OUT-LAW NEWS, Aug. 26,
2005, http://www.out-law.com/page-6055 (last visited Mar. 7, 2006) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
4 Perfect 10 claims Google Gives it Away, RED HERRING, Nov. 20, 2004,
http://www.redherring.com/PrintArticle.aspx?a= 10981 &sector=Industries (last
visited Mar. 7, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
5 Internet Porn Site Sues Google for Copyright and Trademark Infringement,
3-11 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. COPYRIGHT 17 (2004).
6 Supra note 3.
7 Brief for Plaintiff's Motion for preliminary injunction at 14, Perfect 10 v.
Google Inc., No. 2:04-cv-09484 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Google
Brief].8Id.
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authorization, but was also directing users to websites that
misappropriated Perfect 1 O's images.9
Copyright holders have filed actions against search engines for
copyright infringment in the past.1" In addition, as search engines
continue to grow, the struggle between copyright holders and
search engines will only intensify. It has been argued that search
engines are violating copyright protections under federal law" by
"scooping" images from the Internet without the permission of the
creator. However, reproducing and displaying these images may
constitute "fair use" under Section 107 of the Copyright Act, a
provision which excuses conduct that would ordinarily be
infringement because of the existence of certain factors.12
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,3 a landmark case with a
potentially far-reaching impact for copyright law on the Internet,
the Ninth Circuit held that a visual search engine's creation and
use of thumbnails of copyrighted images constituted fair use. A
thumbnail is a reduced version of a full-sized image that allows
users to quickly find visual information. 4 According to the court,
while these thumbnail images serve an aesthetic purpose, the
search engine's use of the thumbnails was "transformative" in that
it improved access to images on the Internet. 5 This Recent
Development argues that under the fair use test, Kelly wrongly
held that a search engine's use of thumbnail images was
transformative and that it did not have an effect on the marketplace
9 'Perfect 10' Litigation Revisits Fair Use of Thumbnails Under Kelly v.
Arriba Soft, 6 COMP. TECH. LAW REP. 424 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at
http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/ctl.nsf/04e3efa0Ic713Ocf85256b57005a98b
4/8d501e02441337488525707d006f4349?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 7,
2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
10 See Google Brief, supra note 7; Brief for Plaintiffs Motion for preliminary
injunction, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., No.2:05-cv-04753 (C.D. Cal.
July 1, 2005) [hereinafter Amazon Brief]; Motion for preliminary injunction,
Agence France Presse (AFP) v. Google, Inc. (D.C. Mar. 17, 2005).
" 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (2000).
12 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (2000).
"3 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
14 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. at 4, n.4 (C.D. CA Feb.
17, 2006).
15 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d at 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
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for the copyrighted materials. First, it will discuss the history and
development of copyright law. Second, it will examine the
background of the Kelly case and then analyze the impact of this
case on a separate claim brought by Perfect 10 against
Amazon.com's search engine, A9.com ("A9"). It then will argue
that Kelly overly broadened the scope of fair use on the Internet.
Finally, this Recent Development will explain how a recent ruling
against Google may be one of the first steps towards curbing the
ever-expanding power of search engines on the Internet.
II. PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A copyright is a legal mechanism that gives the creator the
right to control various uses of her work after it has been shared
with others. 6 These uses include the right to reproduce, as well as
the right to distribute and publicly display the work. 7
The purpose of American copyright law is to encourage the
growth of learning and culture for the public welfare, and the
award of exclusive rights to authors for a limited time is a means to
that end. 8 It is important to balance the rights of the public with
those of the copyright holder:
[T]he needs on each side of the scale reflect two broad values that have
played vital roles throughout American history: on the one side,
protection of private property and the right of every member of
American society, no matter his position, to own private property; and
on the other side, the fundamental right of every member of American
society to better himself and his position in life through education.19
In order to achieve this purpose, two approaches have been
proposed: (1) awarding authors complete rights to their works to
the degree necessary to promote additional innovations, and (2)
restricting authors' control over their works in order to permit
16 ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 12 (6th ed. 2002).
'" 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
18id.
19 GRETCHEN MCCoRD HOFFMAN, COPYRIGHT IN CYBERSPACE 2: QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS FOR LIBRARIANS 4 (2005).
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others to use and thereby develop those works.2 ° Copyright law
attempts to balance the interests of the copyright holder and the
public so that copyright law's purpose of continuing the
development of human knowledge is ultimately accomplished. As
a result, copyright law must continually evolve and react to
changing circumstances in order to accommodate the myriad of
developments that are generated by ever-evolving technological
innovations.2'
II1. BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
states that Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to Authors
and Inventors exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. '22 The text of the Constitution, however, offers scant
guidance regarding the details of what these rights should entail.23
For example, the Constitution does not explain what the term
"exclusive" embodies.24 As a result, Congress was empowered to
fill in gaps and define the scope of copyright law.25
In response to modem technological developments and their
effect on copyright law, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of
1976 to help define the rights of the copyright owner.26 The 1976
Act protects a broad range of subject matter including motion
20 Id. at 3.
21 HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 4.
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23 HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 6.
24 HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 6.
25 In 1790, Congress passed the Copyright Act. HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 6.
The Copyright Act originally granted protection of maps, charts, and books.
HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 6. Throughout the nineteenth century, it was
expanded by amendments to include photographs, artistic works, sculpture, and
prints. HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 6. The Copyright Law of 1909 made some
additional modifications, including increasing the scope of copyright protections
to include all writings by authors and also doubling the term of protection from
two fourteen year terms to two twenty-eight year terms. HOFFMAN, supra note
19, at 7.
26 HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 7.
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pictures, sound recordings and pictorial, graphic, sculptural, and
literary works, motion pictures, and sound recordings.27 In
addition, the 1976 Act gives the copyright owner the exclusive
right to reproduce, display and distribute copies of the copyrighted
work. 28 These rights are the foundation of modem copyright law.
However, these exclusive rights are tempered by a number of
exceptions that may undercut their exclusivity in certain instances.
IV. FAIR USE DOCTRINE
The secondary use of a copyright holder's work can be excused
by the affirmative defense of fair use. 29 Fair use permits works to
be used for purposes of teaching, news reporting, criticism,
scholarship, or research under certain conditions.3" This doctrine
allows courts to prevent an inflexible application of the copyright
statute when such application would restrain the very creativity
which that law is intended to encourage.31 The fair use doctrine
also provides a way of balancing the copyright holder's exclusive
rights to her work with the public's interest in accessing and
developing these works.32
The courts, and subsequently Congress, established a four-
factor test that, if met, permits certain uses of an original work by a
non-copyright holder.33 No single factor alone is determinative."
Rather, courts balance these factors in accordance with the
overriding goals of copyright law.35  In establishing what is
considered fair use, Section 107 of the Copyright Act looks to the:
(1) Purpose and character of the use;
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
28 id.
29 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
30 id.
31 Iowa State Univ. Research Found. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co's., 621 F.2d. 57,
60 (2d. Cir. 1980).
32 Wainwright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977).
13 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 29.
34 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d at 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
35 See id.
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Perfect 10 v. Google
(2) Nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) Amount and substantiality of the portion used in comparison to the
work as a whole; and
(4) Effect on the potential marketplace of the work.36
A. Purpose and Character of Use
The first factor of the fair use test addresses whether the
"secondary use" by the non-copyright holder "is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."37  This factor
considers the socially valuable purpose of the secondary use.38 In
evaluating whether the new use is socially productive, courts must
determine whether the new use merely duplicates the original or if
it is transformative.39 A transformative use is one that enhances the
work, and thus transforms the original work with new expression,
meaning, or message.4" According to Second Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Pierre N. Leval,4 transformative use must be
36 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
37 See 4 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 4-13 § 13.05(A) (1) (a)
(2005) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000)).
38 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE, VOL. 2
214 (1989).39 LLOYD J. JASSIN & STEVEN C. SCHECHTER, THE COPYRIGHT PERMISSION
AND LIBEL HANDBOOK 28 (1998). A transformative work is nearly always
derivative by nature. HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 30. A derivative work is
work that is based upon one or more preexisting works such as a musical
arrangement or an art reproduction, or any other form in which a work may be
transformed or adapted. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Fair use allows uses that
would otherwise violate a copyright owner's rights, including the right to create
derivative works. HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 30. Nevertheless, creating a
derivative work produces a new opportunity for abuse of these rights.
HOFFMAN, supra note 19, at 30. In some circumstances, allowing others to
create derivative works denies the copyright owner of those opportunities.
Leval, infra note 42. Thus, the transformative nature of the use does not
necessarily guarantee a finding of fair use. Leval, infra note 42.
40 id.
41 Before his appointment to the Court of Appeals in 1993, Pierre N. Leval
was the United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New
York.
Spring 2006] 373
N.C.J. L. & TECH.
productive and must use the copyrighted work for a different
function than the original:42
A quotation of copyrighted material that merely repackages or
republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story's
words, it would merely 'supersede the objects' of the original. If on the
other hand, the secondary use adds value to the aesthetics, new insights
and understandings-this is the very type of activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.
43
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 44 the Supreme Court held that while
transformative use is not essential for a finding of fair use, the
purpose of copyright is advanced by the use of transformative
works.45 The Court stated that: "such [transformative] works thus
lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing
space within the confines of copyright." '  Further, the more
transformative the new work, the less significant are other factors,
such as the new work's effect on the marketplace for the
copyrighted work.47
The first factor also accounts for the commercial or non-
commercial character of the use. Generally, the commercial aspect
of the defendant's use will weigh against a finding that the use is
fair." Conversely, the combination of nonprofit character and
educational purposes tends to support a claim for fair use.49
However, a for-profit use does not automatically preclude a finding
of infringement, nor does a nonprofit use guarantee a fair use
defense."
42 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105,
1111 (1990).
43 id.
44 Luther R. Campbell AKA Luke Skywalker v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S.
569 (1994).451 d. at 579.
46 id.
47 Id. Courts frequently contrast transformative uses with "slavish copying"
which adds nothing new to the work. ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It
Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (2005).
48 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 216.
49 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 214.
50 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
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B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
In ascertaining the second fair use factor courts typically take
into account whether the copyrighted work is creative or factual, as
well as whether it is published or unpublished.5 A more creative
work is afforded more protection against copying than a less
creative work.52 For example, courts typically narrow the scope of
fair use for pictorial and graphic work because these works are
generally more creative than functional." On the other hand,
fact-based works such as maps and newspapers are afforded "thin"
copyright protections. 4 In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., Inc.," the Court delineated the use of "thin"
copyrights: "[n]otwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent
compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another's
publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the
competing work does not feature the same selection and
arrangement."56
Further, unpublished works are given more protection than
published works because the right of the first publication protects
particularly important marketing interests. 7 In Harper & Row,
Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters.,58 the Supreme Court held that the
right of first publication includes not only the choice of whether or
not to publish, but also the choices concerning when, where, and
how to first publish a work. 9
C. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion used in Comparison
to the Work as a Whole
The third fair use factor takes into account the portion of
material copied and whether it constituted a fundamental aspect of
51 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 226.
52 JASSIN & SCHECHTER, supra note 39, at 30.
53 JASSIN & SCHECHTER, supra note 39, at 31.
54 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 226.
58 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
'9 Id. at 564.
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the copyrighted work.6" In Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Bleem Corp.,6 the Ninth Circuit stated that the closer the copies
are to the core of the original work and the greater the amount the
original work was copied, the lower probability that the copying
will constitute fair use.62 Generally, a use is less likely to be
deemed fair when the amount of the original work used is
comparatively large, exceptionally influential, or embodies the
heart of the copyrighted work.63
When considering the third fair use factor, qualitative measures
are typically given more weight than quantitative measures.' For
example, "[q]uoting 50 words from a well-known politician's
memoirs in the context of a critical review is probably okay.
Using 50 words from a Maya Angelou poem in an anthology of
contemporary American poets probably constitutes copyright
infringement."65 Thus, courts generally are less likely to make a
finding for fair use if the portions taken by the secondary user are
of significant importance to the work as a whole.66
D. Effect on the Potential Marketplace for the Work
The fourth fair use factor considers the effect of the secondary
use on the value and market for the original work.67 In analyzing
this factor, courts explore whether the secondary use of the work
has or would have a significantly negative impact on the potential
market for, or value of, the original work.68 As soon as the
60 JASS1N & SCHECHTER, supra note 39, at 33.
61 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000).
62Id. at 1028.
63 JASSIN & SCHECHTER, supra note 39, at 33.
64 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 231.
65 JASSIN & SCHECHTER, supra note 39, at 34.
66 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 231.
67 ARNOLD P. LUTZKER, CONTENT RIGHTS FOR CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS 33
(2d ed. 2003).
68 See NIMMER, supra note 37, at 4-13 § 13.05(A) (4). There is a risk of
circularity when discussing the potential market of the original work: "a
potential market, no matter how unlikely, has always been supplanted in every
fair use case, to the extent that the defendant, by definition, has made some
actual use of plaintiffs work, which use could in turn be defined in terms of the
relevant market." NIMMER, supra note 37, at 4-13 § 13.05(A) (4). Therefore, in
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copyright holder determines the existence of a causal relationship
between infringement and loss of profits, the burden shifts to the
infringer to explain how the market for the work would have been
harmed "had there been no taking of copyrighted expression. ' 69 In
order to deny fair use, the copyright holder has to establish that if
the secondary use should become widespread, it would have a
harmful effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work.0
V. KELLY V. ARRIBA SOFT CORP.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,7 the Ninth Circuit applied the
four-factor fair use test to analyze whether a search engine's use of
thumbnail images is a violation of a copyright holder's rights. In
Kelly, professional photographer Leslie Kelly ("Kelly") brought an
action against Internet visual image search engine ditto.com,
formerly known as Arriba Soft ("Arriba"), for copyright
infringement.72 Kelly filed suit after he discovered that thirty-five
of his copyrighted photographs were located in the search engine's
database without his authorization.73 These photographs were
placed on his websites and other websites with which he had a
every fair use case, a secondary use may have a substantial impact on a potential
market if that potential is characterized as a hypothetical market for licensing the
very use at issue. NIMMER, supra note 37, at 4-13 § 13.05(A) (4).
69 Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
70 Id. There is a risk of circularity when discussing the potential market of the
original work "a potential market, no matter how unlikely, has always been
supplanted in every fair use case, to the extent that the defendant, by definition,
has made some actual use of plaintiffs work, which use could in turn be defined
in terms of the relevant market." NIMMER, supra note 37 at 4-13 § 13.05(A) (4).
Therefore, in every fair use case, a secondary use may have a substantial impact
on a potential market if that potential is characterized as a hypothetical market
for licensing the very use at issue. NIMMER, supra note 37 at 4-13 § 13.05(A)
(4).
71 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).72 1d. at 815.
73 Robert W. Clarida, Fair Use on the Web-A Whole New Ballgame?, (Nov.
2000), http://www.legallanguage.com/lawarticles/Clarida003.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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licensing agreement. 74  Arriba acquired its database of images
through the operation of a computer program that "crawls"
websites in search of images." The captured images, including
Kelly's photographs, were reproduced on Arriba's server.76 The
program utilized these reproductions to create smaller, lower
resolution thumbnail images.77 Once the thumbnail images were
produced, the program removed the full-sized images from the
server. 7' These thumbnails, when accessed by someone on the
Internet, could then be reproduced onto a computer's hard drive or
a disk.79 However, a user could not expand the size of the
thumbnail without losing its clarity."
The Arriba program allowed the user to enlarge the thumbnail
image by double-clicking it.8 Between January 1999 and June
1999, double-clicking the thumbnails would link the user to the
"Images Attributes" page. This page included a description of
the size of the image, a link to the originating website, the Arriba
banner, and Arriba advertising.83 It also used a technique called in-
line linking to display the original image:"4
[i]n-line linking allows one to import a graphic from a source website
and incorporate it in one's own website, creating the appearance that
the in-lined graphic is a seamless part of the second web page. The in-
line link instructs the user's browser to retrieve the linked-to image
from the source website and display it on the user's screen, but does so
without leaving the linking document.
85
Therefore, in-line linking enabled the linking party to
incorporate the linked image into its own content. 6 Consequently,
74 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6-7, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d
934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-55521).
71 Kelly, 336 F3d at 815.
76 id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 id.
80 Id.
81 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
:2 Id. at 815-16.
83 Id. at 816.
84 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 10.85 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816.
86 id.
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even though the image in Arriba's "Image Attributes" page was
from the originating website and was not duplicated onto Arriba's
server, it was unlikely that a user would know that the image was
from another website.87 Since a user would never have to visit the
images' originating website, Arriba's services were likely to create
confusion for users and could negatively impact the originating
website's business.
Between July 1999 and August 2000, two links known as
"Source" and "Details" were inserted on Arriba's results page
containing the thumbnails." The "Details" link generated a screen
resembling the "Images Attributes" page, but with a thumbnail
rather than the full-sized image. 9 When a user clicked on the
"Source" link or the thumbnail from the results page, the site
generated two new windows on the top of the Arriba page.9 ° The
window in the front included only the full-sized image and the
window behind it displayed a smaller version of the image's
originating website.9' A portion of Arriba's website was noticeable
underneath both of these windows.92
The district court rejected Kelly's argument that these practices
constituted copyright infringement and awarded summary
judgment for Arriba.93 In rendering its decision, the district court
held that the use of both the thumbnail images and the full-sized
images constituted fair use. 4 In response to the district court's
decision, Kelly filed a motion for partial summary judgment
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 
Id.
90 Id.
91 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003).
92 Id.
93 id.
94 1d. at 816-17. The district court expanded Kelly's original motion to include
a claim for copyright infringement of the full-sized images. Id. at 817. The court
also expanded the scope of Arriba's concession on the prima facie case to
include both the thumbnail images and the full-sized images. Id. The district
court established that two of the fair use factors weighed in Arriba's favor. In
particular, the court found that the character and purpose of Arriba's use was
transformative and the use did not hurt the market for or the value of Kelly's
images. Id.
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contending that Arriba infringed on his display, distribution, and
reproduction rights through its use of the thumbnail images.95
Arriba, in turn, filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.16
With regard to liability for direct infringement resulting from
in-line linking, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
that Arriba had directly infringed on Kelly's right to display his
images. Over one year later, the court withdrew the section of the
Kelly opinion involving direct infringement on procedural
grounds.98 It held that the district court should not have reached
the issue of whether Arriba's framing of full-sized images
constituted direct infringement when neither of the parties filed a
motion for summary judgment on this specific claim.9
In rendering its decision, the Ninth Circuit balanced the four
fair use factors to determine whether the use of thumbnail images
violated Kelly's reproduction rights. l 0 Focusing specifically on
the first and fourth factors-the purpose and character of the use
and the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of,
the copyrighted workl 0l-the court affirmed the district court's
holding that Arriba's use of the thumbnail images constituted fair
use. 102
95Id. at 816.
96 Id. In the motion, Arriba acknowledged that Kelly established a prima facie
case for copyright infringement. In spite of this, it confined its acknowledgment
to the violation of the display and reproduction rights as to the thumbnail
images. Arriba contended that its use of the thumbnail images constituted a fair
use. Id.
97 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. at 17-18 (C.D. CA
Feb. 17, 2006).
98Id. at 18.
99 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).
"O Id. at 818.
101 In particular, the Ninth Circuit focused on the transformative nature of the
use. The purpose of the transformative analysis is to permit uses of works when
those uses add to the public discourse of ideas by incorporating creative
expressions that comment on, criticize, or explain works. See Luther R.
Campbell AKA Luke Skywalker v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994) ("[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.").
l02Kelly, 336 F.3d at 822.
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VI. MISAPPLICATION OF THE FIRST FACTOR
It appears that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the first factor of
the fair use test when it ruled that Arriba's image service added
"meaning, message, or expression" to the thumbnail images. 0 3 In
Kelly, the court found that, unlike Kelly's images, the thumbnails
were small and had a low resolution. 10 4 In addition, the court held
that Arriba's use of Kelly's images was transformative because it
served a different function than Kelly's use of his original images:
Kelly's images are artistic works intended to inform and to engage the
viewer in an aesthetic experience .... Arriba's use of Kelly's images
in the thumbnails is unrelated to any aesthetic purpose. Arriba's search
engine functions as a tool to help index and improve access to images
on the internet and their related web sites.1
05
The traditional application of transformative use-which
focuses on the creation of a new message, meaning, or
expression-does not support the court's analysis." 6 Further, the
Ninth Circuit may have expanded the definition of transformative
use. Arriba's services added no new expression to Kelly's work. °7
Rather, Arriba merely displayed and duplicated it with other
photographs."8 Nor did its services add meaning to Kelly's
work.109 Instead, Arriba simply packaged Kelly's photos with the
images of other photographers."0 Finally, it did not express any
message by grouping Kelly's photographs with other images."'
103 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 29 (arguing that the
district court's analysis of the first factor is "seriously flawed").
'04Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
105 Id.
106 Matthew C. Staples, Annual Review of Law and Technology: I.
Intellectual Property: A. Copyright: 1. Digital Media: Kelly v Arriba Soft
Corp., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 69, 86 (2003).
107 Brief of the American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Leslie A. Kelly at 19, Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-55521)
[hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief].
108 Id.
109 Id.
111 Id.
Spring 2006]
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
The Ninth Circuit blurred convenience with transformation in
the context of copyright law."' Although aggregating Kelly's
photographs with the images of others was helpful for the users of
Arriba's services, Kelly's images were not transformed."' The
images were merely duplicated and arranged for their accessibility
to Arriba's users and for Arriba's own economic advantage." 4
Two Second Circuit cases, Infinity Broadcast Corp. v.
Kirkwood"5 and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com"6 highlight
how the Ninth Circuit's definition of transformative use is quite
expansive when compared to that of the Second Circuit."7  In
short, had the Ninth Circuit followed these cases, Kelly may have
been decided differently.
In Kirkwood, the defendant produced a commercial service
called Dial-Up that allowed subscribers to listen over the telephone
to retransmitted copyrighted radio broadcasts." 8 Similar to Arriba,
the defendant argued that his use was for information purposes
rather than for entertainment purposes." 9  The Second Circuit
denied the defendant's argument that the use of Infinity's
broadcasts had a different purpose than its original use.' Rather,
the defendant's retransmissions "leave the character of the original
broadcasts unchanged."'' The court found that the new use was
not transformative when it did not add a "new expression, new
meaning nor new message" to the original use.' Furthermore, the
Kirkwood court declared that a difference in purpose is not
112 Id
113 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 19.
114 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 19.
"1 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
i16 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
17 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 31-32. Because
Kirkwood and MP3 are from the Second Circuit, they are only persuasive
authority in the Ninth Circuit.
118 Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 106. See also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra
note 86, at 31.
"
9 Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 108.
1o Id. See also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 32.
121 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 32 (quoting Infinity
Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 965 F. Supp. 553, 557 (1997)).
122 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 32.
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necessarily equivalent to transformation.'23 The court ultimately
found that the lack of transformativeness in the defendant's use
outweighed the different purposes proposed by the defendant.'
24
Likewise, the MP3.com court denied the transformative use
argument brought forth by the defendant.'25 Defendant MP3.com
("MP3") copied tens of thousands of copyrighted sound recordings
from CDs onto its computer servers so as to enable its customers to
access the recordings.'26 MP3 performed this service without the
consent of the copyright owners of the sound recordings.'27
Similar to Arriba, MP3 claimed its purpose was to make works
more available to subscribers.'28 The Second Circuit rejected the
argument that MP3's website provided a transformative "space
shift" by which users can take pleasure in the sound recordings
contained on their CDs without having to haul around the physical
discs.'29 Like Arriba, MP3 did not enhance the copyrighted works
in any way by adding new aesthetics or new insights. 3 ° The
MP3.com court reasoned that the copies were merely being
retransmitted in a different medium.' 3' The Second Circuit found
that retransmission in a different medium is an inadequate basis for
a claim of transformation and,"[w]hile such services may be
innovative, they are not transformative.' 3 2 In addition, the court
differentiated convenience from transformation. It found that
copyright is not intended to provide convenience but rather to
safeguard the copyright holder's property interests.
33
123 Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).
124 Id. at 109.
125 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). See also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 32.
126 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
127 id.
128 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 32.
129 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
130 See id.
131 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
132 Id.
113 Id. at 352.
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The Kelly court distinguished Kirkwood and MP3.com from the
facts of Kelly.'34 It found that Arriba's use of images was more
than a transmission of Kelly s images in a different format.135 The
court reasoned that Arriba's use was transformative because the
search engine had a different purpose than that of Kelly: Arriba's
use of the images served to improve access to information on the
Internet, whereas Kelly's use was for aesthetic purposes. 36 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that in MP3, where the defendant
duplicated music CDs in computer MP3 format, both mediums
were used for the ultimate purpose of entertaining the public. 37
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit concluded that in Kirkwood,
retransmitting radio broadcasts so that they were available over
telephone lines did not change the fact that subscribers could use
both types of transmissions for the same purpose. 38
In both Second Circuit cases, the new use was clearly a
substitute for the original. Although Kelly's thumbnails did not
serve as an exact substitute for the original, the Ninth Circuit failed
to address the argument that, like Kirkwood and MP3.com,
Arriba's use of the copyrighted work was effectively the same as
Kelly's use. 39  Both Kelly's website and Arriba's website
generated profits by selling advertising, products, and services. 4 °
And, in order to draw visitors and retain them at their respective
websites, both Kelly and Arriba displayed photographic images.'4
The Ninth Circuit disregarded the fact that Kelly's use of the
images was not exclusively for artistic expression. Rather, both
Arriba and Kelly's use of the images served the same central
purpose: to attract viewers to their respective websites and to sell
products.'42 Unlike Kelly, visual image search engines do not
produce their own images, but rather copy them. As a result,
134 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003).
135 Id.
136 id.
137 id.
138 id.
139 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 29.
140 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 29.
141 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 29.
142 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 30.
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Arriba duplicated Kelly's purpose for its own commercial
advantage.'43 Thus, Arriba's use became precisely what the court
said it was not: a mere retransmission of Kelly's images in a
different medium.
VII. MISAPPLICATION OF THE FOURTH FACTOR
In addition, it appears that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the
fourth factor of the fair use test when it found that Arriba's use of
Kelly's images did not negatively affect the market for, or value
of, these images."' The fourth factor determines the effect of the
infringer's use upon the potential market value for the work.'45 It
requires courts to take into account whether the new use caused
market harm and whether the new user's widespread conduct
would result in an adverse impact on the potential market of the
copyright holder.'46
Various uses of the same work for differing advertising
purposes not approved by the copyright owner frequently diminish
the value of the work. '47 For instance, in Brewer v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.,'48 the Ninth Circuit recognized that a jury could
find that the value of the copyright holder's photograph would
suffer from overexposure through the defendant's use.'49
Kelly illustrates that this overexposure is only exacerbated on
the Internet.' ° Despite the fact that after 2000, a user was directed
to Kelly's website after clicking a thumbnail, Kelly's images still
widely suffered from unauthorized exposure. Kelly used the
photographs on his website as content in order to attract viewers to
his website. 5' Original content is advantageous because "[t]he
more desirable and unique a web site's content is, the more
143 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 30.
'44 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 41.
145 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
146 See NIMMER, supra note 37, at 4-13 § 13.05(A) (4).
147 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 12.
148 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
1491 Id. at 529.
150 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 12.
151 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 42-43.
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viewers will visit it, and the more its owners can charge for
advertising on it." '152 Although after 2000, a user was taken to
Kelly's website after clicking on a thumbnail, Arriba still made
Kelly's images accessible on a website other than his own.
Due to the court's analysis, Kelly essentially was stripped of
the power to control how his photographs were utilized.'53 Kelly
did not have the ability to control the conditions or the context in
which his photographs were displayed or used.'54 This loss of
control could preclude the copyright holder from fully taking
advantage of the market for his work.'55 For instance, the
thumbnails of Kelly's images were not displayed with advertising
selected and sanctioned by Kelly. 6 Instead, it was chosen by
Arriba' 57 As a result, this unauthorized use could ultimately dilute
the advertising value of Kelly's photographs.5 8
Although it could be argued that Arriba's services provided an
economic benefit to Kelly's work by drawing more viewers to his
websites, courts have previously rejected this assertion.' For
example, in DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc.,16° the plaintiff
book publisher filed an action against the defendant's store for
copyright infringement.' 6' The court rejected the argument that the
defendant's use of the copyrighted work supported a finding of fair
use because the use led to a commercial benefit for the plaintiff'62
Rather, the court maintained that the advantage of copyright
ownership was "the right to license its use for a fee."' 63 Since one
of the economic advantages of copyright ownership is a licensing
152 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 13.
153 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 11.
154 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 13.
155 See GoRMAN, supra note 15, at 12.
156 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 10.
157 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 10.
158 Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 107, at 12.
159 See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 23, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
280 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-55521).
160 696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982).
161 Id. at 25. See also Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 159, at
23.
162 DC Comics, 696 F.2d. at 28.
163 id.
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right, the court found that a potential increase in the plaintiffs
sales as a result of the defendant's infringement would not invoke
the fair use defense as a matter of law."M
Likewise, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,65 the court
dismissed the defendant's argument that its activities could only
increase plaintiffs sales. The defendant asserted that subscribers
to defendant's service were unable to retrieve its recordings unless
they had already bought or agreed to buy their own CD copies of
those recordings.'66 The court found that "any allegedly positive
impact of defendant's activities on plaintiffs' prior market in no
way frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly derives
from reproduction of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works."'67 Thus,
an infringer's alleged benefit to the copyright holder does not
necessarily sustain a fair use defense.'68
VII. IMPACT OF KELLY V. ARRIBA SOFT ON FUTURE CLAIMS
AGAINST SEARCH ENGINES: PERFECT 10 V. AMAZON
Kelly has had an impact on future claims against search
engines. Recent legal actions against search engines'69 have shown
the ramifications of upholding the fair use defense in light of
changing technology on the Internet. 7 ' For instance, Perfect 10
accused Amazon.corn ("Amazon") of distributing and displaying
thousands of its copyrighted images on its search engine, A9. 7'
1641id.
165 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (2000).
166 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y
2000).
167 Id.
168 See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 159, at 23.
169 Perfect 10 v. Google. Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx) (C.D. Cal.),
(granting in part and denying in part preliminary injunction); Perfect 10 Inc. v.
Amazon.com Inc., C.D. Cal. No.2:05-cv-04753, motion for a preliminary
injunction filed July 1, 2005, Agence France Presse (AFP) v. Google, Inc., D.C.
motion for a preliminary injunction filed Mar. 17, 2005.
170 Both the Amazon and Google cases are located in the Ninth Circuit and
cannot disregard the Kelly holding.
171 Amazon Brief, supra note 9.
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Similar to its claim against Google, 172 Perfect 10 filed a lawsuit in
the Ninth Circuit against Amazon for using search and indexing
features that ultimately made it too easy for users to access Perfect
10's copyrighted images for free. 173 In challenging Perfect 10's
motion for preliminary injunction, Amazon claimed that its use of
thumbnails is safeguarded under Kelly.'74 It argued that its use, like
Arriba's, is transformative because it functions purely as a research
tool as opposed to Perfect 10's use which is for entertainment
purposes.1
75
This section explores one direction that courts could take when
applying Kelly to determine whether search engines have a viable
fair use defense against copyright infringement for their use of the
thumbnails. It also argues that because of Kelly's emphasis on the
transformative nature of the secondary use, the other two factors
that support a ruling against a fair use claim are likely to be
ignored.
Like the Kelly court, the Amazon court may be disposed to
focus on the first and fourth factors of the fair use test. 7 1 Under
the first factor, the purpose and character of use, there is no doubt
that Amazon's website is for commercial purpose and that Perfect
10's images are included in its search engine database.'77 Despite
the commercial nature of Amazon, the court could find that Perfect
172 Supra note 8.
173 id.
174 Id.
175 id.
176 In Kelly, the court paid little attention to the second and third factors and
the court in Amazon is likely to give similar treatment to these factors. Using
the Kelly analysis, the court is likely to hold that the second factor, the nature of
the copyrighted work, would weigh only slightly in favor of Perfect 10. Despite
the fact that Perfect 10's images were creative in nature and close to the core of
copyright protection, the court may find that the use meets the criteria for fair
use because Perfect 10's images had previously been published. Moreover, the
court is also likely to find that the third factor, the amount and substantiality of
the portion used, neither weighs for nor against Perfect 10 and Amazon.
Although Amazon copied the entirety of Perfect 10's images, the Perfect 10
court may determine that the reproductions of the images in their entirety of the
images were necessary to allow users to identify the images. See Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp. v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
177 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d at 818.
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10's images are not intended to promote Amazon's website nor
does Amazon sell Perfect 10's images.' As for the second inquiry
under the first factor, the court will undoubtedly view the use as
transformative because, as in Kelly, the court could find that the
use serves an entirely different function than that of Perfect 10.179
The court could reason that Amazon's use serves as a tool to
enhance access to images on the Internet whereas Perfect 10's use
is for entertainment purposes. 8 0
Under the fourth factor of the fair use test, the court must
consider the effect of Amazon's use on the market and value of
Perfect 10's images.' 8' In Kelly, the court did not regard the
thumbnail images to have an adverse effect on the market because,
in its view, there was no market for these images.'82 However,
Perfect 10 argues persuasively that there is a market for its
thumbnail images.'83  Perfect 10 sells approximately 7,000
reduced-sized images per month for display on cell phones.'84 The
market for these images is estimated to swell to $5 billion per
year.'85 Furthermore, Perfect 10 claims these smaller images
function as an important part of Perfect 10's business portfolio.'86
The court in Kelly found that users were doubtful to enlarge the
thumbnails and use them for aesthetic purposes because the
thumbnails lose their clarity when enlarged. 8 Unlike Kelly's
images, the resolution of Perfect 10's reduced-size images is high
enough to clearly depict the image, and the images are comparable
to those made available by Amazon.'88 According to Perfect 10,
this difference alters the fair use analysis, as "today a user need not
enlarge the reduced-size images to 'use them for artistic
178 id.
179 id.
180 id.
18' See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
182 See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.
183 Amazon Brief, supra note 9, at 14.
184 Supra note 8.
185 Supra note 8.
186 Amazon Brief, supra note 9, at 10.
187 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 at 818.
188 Amazon Brief, supra note 9, at 11.
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purposes."" 9  Given that the images Amazon displays are
equivalent in size, dimension, and clarity to the copyrighted
images promoted by Perfect 10, Amazon's images arguably have
commercial value comparable to Perfect 10's images. 90 Further,
the Kelly court was convinced that there was no damaging effect
on Kelly's market because the search engine would "guide users to
Kelly's web site rather than away from it"'' by displaying the
thumbnails on its result page when users searched terms associated
with his images.'92 Here, in sharp contrast, Amazon sends users
away from Perfect 10's website to other websites that illegally
display Perfect 10's images.'93
Based on this analysis, Perfect 10 has a compelling argument
that its actual thumbnail images, for which there is an emerging
market, have a significant value that can be harmed by Amazon's
use. Although this argument may be persuasive, it is also probable
that the court will hold that Amazon's use falls within the
boundaries of fair use.194 The court is likely to center its reasoning
on the transformative nature of Amazon's use."' The Kelly court
found that a transformative work is unlikely to have a harmful
effect on the original's market value.'96 The Amazon court may be
inclined to rely on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that the
thumbnails' adverse effect on the market would be minimal
because the secondary use of Perfect 10's images is highly
transformative.'97
Since the Ninth Circuit ruled that any use of copyrighted
content, regardless of commerciality or market harm, may
constitute fair use if it is transformative, the future courts' chief
concern will likely be whether the defendant's use is
189 Perfect 10 Litigation, supra note 8.
190 Amazon Brief, supra note 9, at 9.
'9' Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.192 id.
193 Amazon Brief, supra note 9, at 10.
194 See Staples, supra note 106, at 84 (stating that "Kelly indicates that any
use of copyrighted content, irrespective of commerciality or the amount used,
may be held to constitute fair use if sufficiently transformative.").
195 Staples, supra note 106, at 84.
196 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.
197 Staples, supra note 106, at 84.
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transformative.'98 Guided by Kelly's emphasis on transformative
use, the court will likely stress that transformative works such as
Amazon's thumbnail images are less likely to harm the market for
the copyrighted work.'99 The transformative nature of Amazon's
thumbnails may be enough to offset the search engine's economic
motivation in the court's analysis of the first factor of the fair use
test."°0 As a result, if this is the case, future courts are likely to
overvalue the transformative nature of search engines and
undervalue the legitimate rights of the copyright holder. When
analyzing fair use, the Kelly holding illustrates how courts may fail
to consider any other factors beyond transformative use.
IX. OVERLY BROADENED SCOPE OF FAIR USE ON THE INTERNET
The decision in Kelly employed a much broader scope for fair
use on the Internet than has been recognized with respect to
conventional print and broadcast media.20 ' The Ninth Circuit's
expansive interpretation of fair use on the Internet may be due to
its desire not to put a ceiling on technology. Consequently, many
commentators2 2 have advocated an expansion of fair use on the
Internet. For example, a 2003 article by Douglas Lichtman °3 and
198 Staples, supra note 106, at 85.
199 Staples, supra note 106, at 84.
200 Staples, supra note 106, at 84.
201 Clarida, supra note 73 ("[T]he reasoning of Arriba marks a significant
departure from prior decisions, particularly with respect to transformative use.").
zo2See Kelly Donohue, Recent Article: Court Gives Thumbs-Up For Use of
Thumbnail Pictures Online, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 6 (2002) (giving
general approval to the expansive scope of fair use); see also Khoi D. Dang,
Case Note: Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.: Copyright Limitations on Technological
Innovation on the Internet, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
389, 402 (2002) ("I believe the court reached the correct conclusion regarding
both defendant's infringing reproduction and public display of plaintiffs
copyrighted works.").
203 Douglas Lichtman is Professor of Law at University of Chicago School of
Law. http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/lichtman/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2006)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). His areas of
specialty include patent, copyright, and trademark law, as well as issues related
to the Internet. Id. His research concerns how technology will redefine
traditional legal rules. Id.
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William Landes2 4 supported the restraint of new technologies that
make use of copyrighted material: "[c]opyright law is important,
but at some point copyright incentives must take a backseat to
other societal interests including an interest in promoting the
development of new technologies and an interest in experimenting
with new business opportunities and market structures.""2 5
Similarly, another commentator2 °6 suggested that the expansive
scope of the fair use test on the Internet shows that courts are
giving proper consideration to public benefits when weighing the
issues of incentives and access.2"7  Accordingly, "liberal
application of the fair use exception may encourage desirable
productive uses of content while allowing technological innovators
to create new expression through the transformation of existing
works." '208
The advocacy advanced on behalf of technological innovation
at the expense of the copyright holder reflects the context
surrounding Kelly. Kelly was decided during the infancy of visual
search engines and "the Court seemed reluctant to issue a ruling
that would substantially threaten, if not kill, this new
technology."2 9  Kelly played a role in encouraging the
development of new technology and, more specifically, in
facilitating the exponential growth and power of search engines
such as Google and A9.
204 William Landes is the Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law and Economics
at the University of Chicago Law School, where he teaches intellectual property,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/ faculty/landes/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2006) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
205 Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395 (2003).
206 Staples, supra note 106.
207 Staples, supra note 106, at 83. Mathew Staples wrote the article while a
law student at University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall. He is currently an
associate for Perkins Coie LLP, http://www.perkinscoie.com/attorney.cfin?
id=00840 (last visited Mar. 7, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
208 Staples, supra note 106, at 83.
209 Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Web Surfing 101: The Evolving Law of
Hyperlinking, 2 BARRY L. REV. 37, 64 (2001).
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The rationale for broadening the scope of fair use to promote
the development of new technologies raises several important
questions: does this rationale strike the right balance between the
competing interests of copyright owners and the public in the
realm of the Internet? Now that the technology surrounding visual
search engines has advanced, will courts finally look to the
interests of the copyright holder? In other words, will the interests
of search engines such as Google take a backseat to the copyright
holder's rights on the Internet?
The decision in Kelly presents compelling questions
concerning the degree to which the fair use doctrine will offer
protection to parties that knowingly and deliberately copy visual
works through technological innovations on the Internet.21 As
search engines gain disproportional market control, copyright
owners are going to have increasing trouble finding a remedy
against those who wish to take advantage of their work by
"organizing and providing access" to it under the reasoning of
Kelly.211
X. CURBING SEARCH ENGINE'S POWER
Kelly held that the use of thumbnails in a search engine
constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act."' Perfect 10 v.
Google, Inc. is one of the first indications that courts are willing to
curb search engines' power on the Internet, thereby undercutting
the freedom provided to search engines by Kelly. As discussed in
the Introduction, Perfect 10 accused Google of misappropriating
thousands of its images.213 Perfect 10 contended that its reduced-
sized images possess commercial value and its business heavily
relies on these copyrighted works.214 On February 17, 2006, Judge
210 Richard S. Taffet & Kelly M. Slavitt, When Is Display Of Images on
Internet Considered Fair Use?; Ninth Circuit's "Kelly" Decisions Present
Questions on Protecting Photographic Works, NY L.J. (Oct. 20, 2003).
211 Clarida, supra note 73.
212 Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
213 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17,
2006).
214 Perfect 10 claims that Google gave it away, supra note 4.
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A. Howard Matz of the U.S. District Court of the Central District
of California granted a preliminary injunction against Google
finding that Google's creation and display of thumbnails of Perfect
10's copyrighted images is not likely to be fair use.2"' This
decision may temper the holding of Kelly and strike a balance
between the competing interests in copyright law.
In looking to the first factor, the purpose and character of the
use, the Google court focused on whether the use is commercial
and whether the use is transformative.1 6 It determined that
Google's use is commercial because displaying the copyrighted
images financially benefits the Google Image Search function by
increasing user traffic and, thus, increasing advertising revenue.2"7
In determining whether the use is transformative, the court
contrasted how Google and Perfect 10 use the copyrighted
images."8 It found that Perfect 10's use of its photos is primarily
to provide entertainment on the Internet and, for some, to create an
aesthetic experience." 9 On the other hand, Google's use is
intended to provide expedited and efficient access to Google Image
Search users. Like in Kelly, the court agreed that Google's use of
thumbnails is highly transformative.2 °
The court refused to end the fair use analysis after determining
the transformative nature of the use, however. 2 ' Instead, it went
one step further to hold that Google's use also superseded Perfect
10's images by failing to add a further purpose.2 The court found
that because Perfect 10 licenses its reduced-sized images for
downloading and use on cell phones, Google's use of thumbnails
superseded Perfect 10's use by profiting from its reduced-sized
215 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. at 33 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
17, 2006).
216 Id. at 25.
2171id.
218 Id. at 28.
219 id.
220 See id.
221 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. at 29 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
17, 2006).
222 Id.
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images. 2 ' The court reasoned that cell phone users are able to
download and store the thumbnails displayed by Google Image
Search onto their phones. 24 Importantly, the size and clarity of
thumbnail images that Google displays are equivalent to the
reduced-sized images that Perfect 10 licenses.225
The Google court's decision turned on the fourth factor, the
impact of Google's use on Perfect 10's market. 26 Under the fourth
factor, the court took into consideration that a transformative work
is less likely to have an adverse impact on the market of the
original than a work that supersedes the copyrighted work.227
However, the court still found that Google's use of thumbnails is
likely to damage Perfect 1 O's potential market for the downloading
of reduced-sized images onto cell phones. 2  The court declared
that users are more likely to download free images to their phone
than to buy Perfect 10's reduced-sized images. 29
In weighing the four factors, the court found that the first and
fourth factor weighed slightly in favor of Perfect 10.230 Despite the
great value that search engines provide to the public, the court
concluded that Google directly infringed Perfect 10's copyrights
by creating and displaying thumbnail copies of its photographs. 3'
Agreeing that search engines provide a public benefit and have
become indispensable resources of information for individuals,
governments, and businesses, 232 the court nevertheless claimed it
was:
223 id.
224 id.
225 id.
226 Google Stung by Porn Ruling, RED HERRING, Feb. 21, 2006,
http://www.redherring.com/article.aspx?a= 15 816 (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
227 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. at 32 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
17, 2006).
228 id.
229 Id. at 28-29.
230 Id. at 33. The court also analyzed the second and third factors and, like
Kelly, found that the second factor weighed slightly in favor of Perfect 10 and
the fourth factor weighed in neither Perfect 10's nor Google's favor. Id.2311Id. at 46.
232 ld. at 29.
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[R]eluctant to issue a ruling that might impede the advance of internet
technology, and although it is appropriate for courts to consider the
immense value to the public of such technologies, existing judicial
precedents do not allow such considerations to trump a reasoned
analysis of the four fair use factors.
233
Although the public's interests are being served by providing
quick and efficient access to users, the public's interests can also
be served when the copyright holder's rights are safeguarded
against illegal use. 3 In sum, this decision may afford copyright
holders more protection on the Internet than the Kelly holding
afforded.
XI. CONCLUSION
As the body of law surrounding the issue of copyrights in the
digital age develops, copyright holders' rights continue to be in a
state of flux, which could undermine incentives for innovation and
ultimately weaken the basic tenets of copyright law. Fair use must
not be used to weaken the protections for creative expression
embodied by copyright law. The fair use doctrine should instead
strike a balance between the rights of copyright owners and the
general public. Unfortunately, the Kelly decision does not provide
a balance between these opposing interests. However, Google's
ruling may mark a shift in copyright law on the Internet by
attempting to balance these interests. Hopefully, subsequent
courts, such as the court in Perfect 10 v. Amazon, will follow
Google and seriously consider the harmful effects that an
expansive fair use test could have on copyright holders in the
realm of the Internet.
233 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, slip op. at 33 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
17, 2006).234 Id. at 46.
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